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Summary 
The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States may be susceptible to terrorist attack 
using biological pathogens. In addition to the economic effects of such an attack, some animal 
pathogens could cause illness in humans. Diseases that can spread from animals to people are 
known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may 
lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk 
and effects of a successful terrorist attack. 
To safeguard the United States against the introduction of non-native animal disease, Congress 
has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Some of this work is 
performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off the coast of New York. 
Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and transferred ownership 
and operation of PIADC from USDA to DHS. The USDA and DHS cooperate to conduct foreign 
animal disease research at PIADC, but they have identified PIADC as outdated and too limited to 
continue as the primary facility for this research. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, issued by President G.W. Bush, tasks the Secretaries 
of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-
art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic 
capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially 
meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress appropriate funds to construct a new facility, 
the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-
biocontainment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, 
as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS has selected Manhattan, Kansas, as the NBAF 
site and plans to open the facility in 2015. The DHS estimates the final, total facility construction 
cost as $725 million, significantly exceeding earlier projections. Additional expenses, such as 
equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC 
facility for disposition, are expected to add $190 million. 
Research with live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is allowed on the U.S. mainland only if 
explicitly permitted by the USDA Secretary. However, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 
2008 (P.L. 110-246) instructs USDA to issue such a permit to DHS for possession of FMD virus 
at NBAF, subject to select agent rules. 
The DHS plans regarding the NBAF raise several policy issues. Concerns about safety and 
security, previously expressed about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous 
pathogens, are also being voiced about NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as 
prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense, may be reassessed if more high-
containment laboratory space becomes available. 
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Introduction 
The U.S. agricultural and food infrastructure is a key component of economic productivity and 
growth. A terrorist attack on this infrastructure could damage the public’s trust in agricultural 
safety and quality and the nation’s ability to provide food and other agricultural products.1 
Additionally, many animal diseases can infect humans.2 These types of diseases are termed 
zoonotic. Scientific and medical understanding of zoonotic diseases in their animal hosts may 
lead to the discovery and development of new medical countermeasures for the animals 
themselves, as well as for humans. 
To safeguard the United States against the impacts of naturally occurring and intentional animal 
disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in animal disease 
research, including research into highly contagious animal pathogens and animal diseases not 
native to the United States.3 Such research activities have historically been performed at the Plum 
Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located on Plum Island, an island near Long Island, New 
York. 
When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the 
operation of the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS, though USDA still maintains an active 
research program at PIADC. The DHS, in cooperation with USDA, has established its own 
research and development program at PIADC. As the federal government undertakes new efforts 
in human biodefense and defense against agroterrorism, DHS has characterized the PIADC 
facility as “reaching the end of its life cycle” and lacking critical capabilities. The DHS asserts 
that PIADC can no longer continue as the primary facility performing this research.4 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), issued by President G.W. Bush, tasks the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop “a plan to provide safe, secure, and 
state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic 
capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.”5 The Secretary of Homeland Security is 
directed to coordinate an acceleration and expansion of new and current countermeasure 
development. These countermeasures are to be against the intentional introduction or natural 
occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases, including “countermeasure 
research and development of new methods for detection, prevention technologies, agent 
characterization, and dose response relationships for high-consequence agents in the food and the 
water supply.”6 
The Department of Homeland Security announced it will establish a new facility, the National 
Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), to meet the obligations of HSPD-9.7 This facility would 
                                                             
1
 For more background on the potential of terrorism directed against agriculture and food, see CRS Report RL32521, 
Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness, by Jim Monke. 
2
 Examples include influenza, plague, West Nile fever, and Rift Valley fever. 
3
 These diseases are sometimes referred to as foreign animal diseases (FAD). 
4
 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, FY2006 Congressional Justification, p. 44. 
5
 Executive Office of the President, The White House, “Subject: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food,” 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9, January 30, 2004. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 72 Fed. Reg. 41764-41765 (July 31, 2007). 
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have high-containment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at 
PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS engaged in a site-selection process to 
determine the location for the NBAF. After evaluating several sites, DHS released a draft8 and a 
final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)9 addressing each site. The DHS chose Manhattan, 
Kansas, as the NBAF location.10 The DHS plans to establish NBAF on the mainland have raised 
congressional and public concerns regarding its safety and security and policy questions 
regarding DHS and USDA coordination of research to be conducted at NBAF. Additionally, the 
projected costs for the NBAF have continued to increase. 
This report outlines progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents projected funding 
requirements and timelines, and analyzes policy issues of potential interest to Congress. These 
issues include the need for and scope of the laboratory, the possible consequences of a pathogen 
release, the adequacy of pathogen-release response plans, the sufficiency of plans to conduct 
highly contagious animal disease research on the mainland, the extent of interagency 
coordination, the slippage of construction timelines, the final disposition of PIADC and Plum 
Island, and community safety concerns. 
NBAF Research Goals 
The DHS intends the new NBAF to be more than just a replacement facility for PIADC; DHS 
intends it to exceed PIADC’s capacity and capability. The highest level of biocontainment 
available at PIADC is Biosafety Level 3 Agricultural (BSL-3Ag).11 Because DHS plans to 
perform experiments with some pathogens that require a higher level of biocontainment, 
approximately 10% of NBAF’s gross square footage would be BSL-4 laboratories.12 
The DHS foresees multiple uses and goals for the new facility: 
• serving as a unique BSL-3 and BSL-4 livestock laboratory capable of developing 
countermeasures for foreign animal diseases; 
                                                             
8
 Department of Homeland Security, National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 
June 2008, available online at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1187734676776.shtm. 
9
 Department of Homeland Security, National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Final Environmental Impact Statement, 
December 2008, available online at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1187734676776.shtm. 
10
 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, “Record of Decision for the National Bio 
and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement,” 74 Fed. Reg. 3065-3080 (January 16, 2009). 
11
 Biosafety, in this context, refers to the recommended protective measures to lower the risk of unintentional infection 
or pathogen release from the laboratory. The Department of Health and Human Services develops and publishes 
guidelines establishing best practices for four biosafety levels (Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention and National Institutes of Health, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 
Laboratories, 5th Edition, February 2007, available online at http://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/
bmbl5toc.htm). The BSL-3Ag containment level was established by the USDA for research with certain pathogens in 
large animal species (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, ARS Facilities Design Standards, 
242.1-M ARS, July 24, 2002, available online at http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/PDF/242-01M.pdf). For more on 
biosafety levels and high containment laboratories see CRS Report R40418, Oversight of High-Containment Biological 
Laboratories: Issues for Congress, by Frank Gottron and Dana A. Shea. 
12
 For example, Nipah virus research requires BSL-4 biocontainment. Since the United States has limited space to 
perform large animal research under BSL-4 containment, U.S. scientists have gone outside the country, for example to 
Canada, to conduct such experiments. Testimony by James Roth, Director, Center for Food Security and Public Health, 
Iowa State University, before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, on July 20, 2005, available 
online at http://agriculture.senate.gov/Hearings/hearings.cfm?hearingid=1572&witnessId=4472. 
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• providing advanced test and evaluation capability for threat detection, 
vulnerability assessment, and countermeasure assessment for animal and 
zoonotic diseases; and 
• supporting the countermeasure licensing process.13 
The research agenda for NBAF is to be at least partially based on current risk assessments and 
subject to change along with assessed risk. The DHS predicts that the facility will focus on foot 
and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever, African swine fever, Rift Valley fever, Nipah 
virus encephalitis, Hendra virus disease, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, and Japanese 
encephalitis.14 The DHS plans to perform research at NBAF to study how these pathogens enter 
the animal, what types of cells the disease affects, what effects the disease has on cells and 
animals, and how newly developed countermeasures help the animal develop protection against 
the disease. 
NBAF Site Selection 
In January 2006, DHS issued a Request for Expressions of Interest from consortia interested in 
hosting NBAF. In August 2006, DHS selected 18 sites from the 29 submitted expressions of 
interest for further evaluation. An intergovernmental review group, which included DHS, USDA, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Defense, evaluated these 
sites.  
In July 2007, DHS selected five sites as finalists for further analysis (see Table 1). This analysis 
included preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that evaluated the selected 
sites. The DHS added Plum Island as a selected site, even though DHS had not responded to its 
own Request for Expressions of Interest nor evaluated Plum Island during the intergovernmental 
review. Subsequent to the selection of the final sites, potential irregularities in the selection 
process were identified.15 Some sites rated more positively were rejected in favor of sites with 
less positive ratings according to internal DHS documentation. The DHS asserted that the 
decision of which sites would become finalists was made based on factors beyond those 
considered in the described documentation, specifically highlighting the “unique contributions 
certain consortia committed to make.”16 
                                                             
13
 71 Fed. Reg. 3107-3109, January 19, 2006. 
14
 Department of Homeland Security, Facility Research & Staffing for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, 
June 12, 2007, available online at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1181073261627.shtm. 
15
 Larry Margasak, “NBAF Choices Suspect; Experts Ignored,” Associated Press, August 10, 2008. 
16
 Ibid. 
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Table 1. Finalists for NBAF Site 
Consortium Location 
Georgia Consortium for Health and Agro-Security University of Georgia Athens, GA 
Heartland BioAgro Consortium Kansas State University Manhattan, KS 
Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium Flora Industrial Park Madison County, MS 
North Carolina Consortium for the NBAF Umstead Research Farm Butner, NC 
Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium Texas Research Park San Antonio, TX 
Department of Homeland Security Plum Island, NY 
Source: DHS, online at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1184180641312.shtm and 72 Fed. Reg. 41764-41765 
(July 31, 2007). 
The EIS development involved public hearings and comment.17 The DHS published the draft EIS 
for comment in June 2008.18 Following the public comment period, DHS published the final EIS 
in December 2008.19 
In January 2009, DHS chose Manhattan, Kansas, as the site for the new facility.20 According to 
DHS, it based this decision on the EIS and other completed analyses. Other studies and 
assessments DHS identified as used included: 
• Threat and Risk Assessment,  
• Site Cost Analysis,  
• Site Characterization Study,  
• Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study, and  
• prior analysis of the alternative sites against DHS’s site selection evaluation 
criteria.21  
A panel of government employees considered the information in these reports and reported its 
findings to the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology who chose the site.22 The 
selection criteria included:  
                                                             
17
 Additional information on the potential sites and dates for public meetings about the EIS are available at 72 Fed. 
Reg. 41764-41765 (July 31, 2007) and 73 Fed. Reg. 36540-36542 (June 27, 2008). 
18
 Department of Homeland Security, National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 
June 2008, available online at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1187734676776.shtm. 
19
 Department of Homeland Security, National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Final Environmental Impact Statement, 
December 2008, available online at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1187734676776.shtm. 
20
 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, “Record of Decision for the National Bio 
and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement,” 74 Fed. Reg. 3065-3080 (January 16, 2009). 
21
 73 Fed. Reg. 36541 (June 27, 2008). 
22
 Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, August 18, 2008. 
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• proximity to research capabilities;  
• proximity to workforce;  
• cost of acquisition, construction, and operations;  
• community acceptance;  
• relative threat and risk; and  
• environmental impacts.  
According to DHS’s analysis, each proposed site’s environmental impact and relative threat and 
risk were “very similar.”23 Of the remaining four criteria, DHS gave greater consideration of the 
site’s proximity to research facilities that could be linked to NBAF’s mission.24 
NBAF Funding 
In the DHS Science and Technology Directorate FY2006 congressional budget justification, DHS 
provided a NBAF project schedule that included a summary of major milestones, a projected time 
line for meeting the milestones, and projected funding requirements by fiscal year. The NBAF 
was to cost $451 million and begin operation in 2010. Subsequent budget and planning 
documents have changed both the final cost projections and the date when operations begin (see 
Table 2). The DHS Science and Technology Directorate FY2010 congressional budget 
justification states that the facility will cost $915 million. The DHS anticipates completing facility 
construction in 2015 and commencing full operation of NBAF in 2017.25 It remains unclear how 
any additional construction delays would affect the total cost of the project and future annual 
appropriations requests.26 
 
                                                             
23
 Department of Homeland Security, Preferred Alternative Selection Memorandum for the National Bio and Agro-
Defense Facility (NBAF), December 4, 2008, p. 5, available online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
nbaf_preferred_alternative_memo.pdf. 
24
 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, “Record of Decision for the National Bio 
and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement,” 74 Fed. Reg. 3065-3080 (January 16, 2009) at 3071. 
25
 Department of Homeland Security, FY2010 Congressional Justification, p. S&T R&D 161. 
26
 Material and labor costs may be higher or lower at the time of construction than at the time of the initial projection. 
An increase in total cost due to increased material expense occurred during construction of another DHS high 
containment biological laboratory, the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. See CRS Report 
RL32891, The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress, by Dana A. Shea. 
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Table 2. Changing NBAF Funding Requirements 
($ in millions) 
Year of 
Projection FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 Total 
2005 3.0 23.0a 73.0 129.0 129.0 94.0 0 451.0 
2007 0a 12.0a 23.0 11.0 45.6 184.9 172.0 448.5b 
2008 0a 12.0a 23.0a 11.0 35.6 183.8 170.7 436.1c 
2009 0a 12.0a 23.0a 11.0a 35.6 96.3 737.1d 915.0e 
Source: CRS calculations based on data from Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology 
Directorate, FY2006 Congressional Justification; Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology 
Directorate, Five-Year Research and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May 2007; Department of 
Homeland Security, personal communication September 10, 2007; Department of Homeland Security, Science 
and Technology Directorate, Five-Year Research and Development Plan, Fiscal Years 2008-2012, August 2008; and 
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification. 
a. These values were not included in the DHS projection, but are taken from actual funding. See Table 4.  
b. The DHS did not include costs beyond FY2011 in this five year projection, although they predicted 
construction to continue until 2014.  
c. This projection indicated that DHS would not request any appropriations in FY2012 or FY2013 for NBAF 
construction. 
d. The DHS combined projected costs for FY2011-FY2014 into a single entry in this projection. 
e. The DHS included site-specific costs in this estimate, which partially accounts for the large increase 
between 2008 and 2009 projections. See “Site Specific and Additional Costs.” This figure includes $725 
million in site-specific costs shown in Table 3, and $190 million for decontamination, deconstruction, and 
relocation expenses. 
Site Specific and Additional Costs 
In 2007, DHS stated that the overall construction cost will depend on the site selected and that 
site-specific infrastructure costs might increase the total cost above $451 million.27 Cost 
projections prior to the January 2009 site selection excluded such site-specific costs. In 2008, 
DHS published site-specific construction cost estimates (see Table 3).28 
 
 
                                                             
27
 Such site specific costs might include improving electrical, water, or transportation infrastructure for particular sites. 
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Five-Year Research and Development Plan, 
Fiscal Years 2007-2011, May 2007 and Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, September 10, 
2007. 
28
 Department of Homeland Security, National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Site Cost Analysis, July 2008. Available 
online at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/gc_1187734676776.shtm. 
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Table 3. Site-Specific Cost Estimates 
($ in millions) 
Cost Category 2005 Baseline KS NY 
Construction 390.0a 563.0 752.4 
Other Costsb 61.0c 161.6 186.9 
Total 451.0 724.6d 939.3 
Source: CRS calculations from Department of Homeland Security estimates. Department of Homeland Security, 
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Site Cost Analysis, July 2008. 
a. This figure did not include site-specific improvements to infrastructure and other site-specific costs.  
b. Includes planning, project development, technical document review, architectural/engineering costs, 
commissioning agents fees, and owner management contingency fees.  
c. This figure did not include technical document review or owner management contingency fees.  
d. Does not include $190 million in decontamination, deconstruction, and relocation expenses. When these 
costs are included the total equals $915 million as indicated in Table 2.  
The DHS cost analysis shows that the 2005 baseline underestimated the total cost of the project. 
The total construction cost for the preferred site is $725 million, $274 million or 60% higher than 
the 2005 baseline projection. This cost includes $173 million more in infrastructure upgrades and 
other site specific costs and $100 million more in non-site-specific costs. Some of the increase in 
other costs reflects additional charges arising from services not originally included in the 2005 
baseline. 
By choosing a site on the mainland, DHS may be able to offset some of the NBAF construction 
costs by selling Plum Island (see “Selling Plum Island” below). However, the site will likely 
require deconstruction, decontamination, and remediation before DHS can sell Plum Island. 
Additionally, DHS will incur expenses transferring equipment and projects from PIADC to 
NBAF. The DHS estimates costs for deconstruction, decontamination, remediation, and 
relocation will total $190 million.29 The DHS has projected requesting $61 million in FY2013 for 
the initial contract award for PIADC decontamination and decommissioning planning and 
scoping.30 
The NBAF construction funding requirements may be lowered by contributions from the 
Heartland BioAgro Consortium, the supporters of the Kansas site. The DHS expects the 
consortium to provide land for NBAF at no cost and invest an additional $110 million in 
infrastructure upgrades as “in-kind” contributions.31 
NBAF Appropriations 
Actual NBAF funding did not follow early projections (see Table 4). The DHS has requested, and 
received, appropriations at a level lower than initially projected in 2005. The DHS Science and 
Technology Directorate FY2006 congressional budget justification stated that NBAF funding 
                                                             
29
 Department of Homeland Security, FY2010 Congressional Justification, p. S&T R&D 161. 
30
 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Five-Year Research and Development Plan, 
Fiscal Years 2008-2012, August 2008, p. 143. 
31
 Department of Homeland Security, FY2010 Congressional Justification, p. S&T R&D 161. 
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began in FY2005 when “$3 M was received for a planning and feasibility study from base 
funding of Biological Countermeasures.”32 However, DHS has subsequently clarified that the 
FY2005 funding was used elsewhere in DHS and that FY2006 and FY2007 appropriations 
funded these studies.33 In FY2006, Congress appropriated $23 million to select a site and conduct 
other pre-construction activities.34 In FY2007, an additional $23 million was appropriated for site 
selection and other pre-construction activities.35 The FY2007 DHS appropriations act also 
included a $125 million rescission of unobligated prior year appropriations from Science and 
Technology Directorate accounts. As part of its implementation of this law, DHS removed $11 
million from the FY2006 NBAF appropriation.36 In FY2008, Congress appropriated $11 million 
to continue environmental studies necessary to select a site for NBAF.37 In FY2009, Congress 
fully funded the President’s $35.6 million request to continue progress on NBAF construction.38 
In FY2010, Congress appropriated $32 million for NBAF construction and a related National 
Academy of Sciences study.39 However, Congress restricted the use of FY2009 and FY2010 
appropriations pending additional reviews of the risk assessment process (see “Congressional 
Restrictions on the Use of Appropriated Funds”). 
Table 4. NBAF Funding 
($ in millions) 
Action FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 
DHS Allocation 3 — — — — — 
DHS Reallocation (3) — — — — — 
P.L. 109-90 — 23 — — — — 
P.L. 109-295 — (11) 23 — — — 
P.L. 110-161 — — — 11 — — 
P.L. 110-329 — — — — 36 — 
P.L. 111-83 — — — — — 32 
Total Annual 
Appropriations 0 12 23 11 36 32 
Source: Funding rounded to nearest million. CRS calculations based on DHS congressional budget justifications, 
H.Rept. 109-241, H.Rept. 109-699, Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of 
Representatives, on H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329, H.Rept. 111-298, and DHS personal communications. 
                                                             
32
 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, FY2006 Congressional Justification, p. 45. 
33
 Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, September 10, 2007. 
34
 H.Rept. 109-241 to accompany H.R. 2360 (P.L. 109-90), p. 78. 
35
 H.Rept. 109-699 to accompany H.R. 5441 (P.L. 109-295), p. 168. 
36
 Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, September 10, 2007. 
37
 P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. 
38
 P.L. 110-329, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. 
39
 H.Rept. 111-298. 
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Policy Issues 
The 110th Congress passed NBAF-related legislation to allow DHS to perform live foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) virus research on the mainland and to sell Plum Island. The Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, also referred to as the 2008 farm bill) 
requires the Secretary of Agriculture to provide DHS a permit to possess live FMD virus on the 
U.S. mainland at a single facility that succeeds PIADC. The Consolidated Security, Disaster 
Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329) requires the sale of Plum 
Island if DHS selects a mainland site for NBAF.  
In addition to the basic funding issues discussed above regarding increasing projected 
construction costs and the appropriate annual funding level, NBAF raises several other policy 
issues. These include the need for and scope of the laboratory, the possible consequences of a 
pathogen release, the adequacy of pathogen-release response plans, the sufficiency of plans to 
conduct highly contagious animal disease research on the mainland, the extent of interagency 
coordination, the slippage of construction timelines, the final disposition of PIADC and Plum 
Island, and community safety concerns. 
Need for and Scope of NBAF 
Agencies and organizations in addition to DHS have identified needs that could be met by NBAF. 
At least as early as 1999, USDA recognized a need for a BSL-4 facility capable of handling large 
animals. In response to congressional mandate,40 USDA commissioned a strategic planning task 
force that recommended the “Agricultural Research Service must consider upgrading current 
Level 2 and Level 3 bio-containment units for animals and constructing a Level 4 unit.”41 In 
2005, the National Research Council (NRC) echoed the need for a BSL-4 facility capable of 
handling large animals. The NRC also concluded that PIADC was at the end of its life cycle and 
that it should be “replaced urgently.”42 
While USDA and DHS have repeatedly stated their need for a new BSL-4 facility, neither 
department has publicly detailed how they determined their space requirements for this facility. In 
response to questions for the hearing record, DHS asserted that: 
Site criteria and requirements for NBAF were developed by an interagency technical 
working group, including DHS, USDA, and HHS, to evaluate sites that would best support 
research in high-consequence animal and zoonotic diseases in support of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives, HSPD-9 and HSPD-10.43 
The DHS has not publicly released supporting documentation relating to the working group’s 
deliberations. 
                                                             
40
 P.L. 104-127, Subtitle D, section 884. 
41
 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Report on the Strategic Planning Task Force on USDA Research Facilities: Report 
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The DHS projects the size of NBAF to be more than 500,000 gross square feet.44 Approximately 
55,000 gross square feet of the facility would be BSL-4 laboratory space (see Table 5). The 
NBAF would be more than twice as large as PIADC.45 This sizeable increase in laboratory 
capacity may meet the requirements put forth by HSPD-9, as well as establishing the expanded, 
modern facilities necessary to replace PIADC and perform research activities. Full use of this 
expanded laboratory space may pose a challenge to federal research planners. Other federal 
agencies have also expanded their research laboratory capacity, including BSL-3Ag space, 
providing alternative venues for performing such research.46 
Table 5. NBAF Space Compared to PIADC Space  
(Net Square Footage) 
Space NBAF PIADC 
BSL-2 9,570 4,488 
BSL-3E 36,080 28,311 
BSL-3Ag 62,144 31,868 
BSL-4 15,290 0 
Vaccine Production 7,080 0 
Other 389,803 169,535 
Total 519,967 234,202 
Source: Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, personal communication, 
April 27, 2009.  
Note: “Other” includes office and support space including space for mechanical and air handling needs. 
The ability of DHS to effectively use the newly constructed BSL-4 and BSL-3Ag laboratories 
may require efficient interagency cooperation to identify other agency research activities that 
could be performed at NBAF. The DHS and USDA investment into research areas done currently 
at PIADC may also need to increase to fill the expanded capacity. Additionally, the new 
capability to perform experiments requiring BSL-4 laboratory space may require either additional 
research and development funding or diversion of funding streams previously devoted to BSL-2 
and BSL-3 experiments. The DHS and USDA may need to analyze their current and future BSL-3 
BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 research requirements to effectively and efficiently use NBAF.47 
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Adequacy of Protection Against Pathogen Release 
A pathogen release is a potential risk at all high-biocontainment laboratories. Laboratory 
operators implement biosafety and biosecurity guidelines to reduce the probability that a 
pathogen might be released from a laboratory.48 Thus, the likelihood that a pathogen would be 
accidentally or intentionally released from the laboratory into the surrounding area is generally 
considered to be low, but not zero. 
Biosafety Guidelines 
The HHS and USDA have developed guidelines for the construction, maintenance, and operation 
of high-biocontainment laboratories. These guidelines aim to protect laboratory workers against 
occupational exposure to pathogens and to minimize accidental pathogen release. The guidelines 
also take into account the properties of the pathogen and the types of experiments being 
performed. The established biocontainment levels have increasing levels of rigor, and 
government, academic, and industrial laboratories adhere to these biocontainment protocols as a 
matter of best practice.49 
Despite procedural and physical barriers, accidental releases and occupational exposures have 
happened at high containment laboratories. The GAO documented multiple examples of FMD 
being found outside of laboratory high containment areas worldwide, including several at 
PIADC.50 Since 2004, laboratory workers in the United States have been exposed to several 
pathogens, including those that cause tularemia, Ebola hemorrhagic fever, anthrax, Q fever, and 
brucellosis.51 The DHS acknowledges that additional biocontainment failures exist.52 
Biosecurity Requirements 
Congress, responding to security concerns regarding the potential for terrorist use of pathogens, 
authorized the creation of the “select agent” regulations.53 Under these regulations, USDA and 
HHS identify and list as select agents pathogens and toxins that pose a severe threat to public, 
animal, or plant health. Agricultural select agents are pathogens and toxins, including FMD virus, 
that pose a severe threat to animal or plant health.54 Entities that possess, use, or transfer these 
select agents are required to develop security plans for protecting the select agents, register with 
the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and become certified as eligible 
to possess select agents. Researchers handling select agents must register with and pass a security 
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review by the Department of Justice. The PIADC must conform to the Agricultural Select Agent 
Program regulations promulgated by USDA, and the NBAF would have to conform, as well. 
Even with these guidelines and regulations in place, some critics remain concerned that these 
protections may be insufficient.55 Government investigations have found many examples of 
laboratories not complying with the select agent rules. In a 2006 report, the HHS Inspector 
General investigated representative universities and state, local, private, or commercial 
laboratories. Eleven of 15 universities investigated had not fully complied with the select agent 
regulations. None of the eight state, local, private, or commercial laboratories investigated were 
in full compliance with the select agent regulations. 56 The USDA Inspector General similarly 
found compliance problems.57 The HHS Inspector General levied a total of $2,037,000 in fines 
and suspended one laboratory’s permission to use select agents in response to these and other 
violations.58 
Consequences of a Pathogen Release 
Although the likelihood of a pathogen release is low, pathogens have been accidentally released 
from high containment laboratories. The potential consequences of an accidental or deliberate 
release vary widely. The impact would depend on many factors, including pathogen type; amount, 
location, and method of release; weather conditions; nearby presence of susceptible humans or 
animals; and the effectiveness of any government and private sector response.  
The NBAF Environmental Impact Statement addresses some of the consequences of a foreign 
animal disease pathogen release from NBAF. The EIS analysis focuses mainly on economic 
consequences rather than on public health. The EIS analysis does not attempt to determine the full 
range of all possible results from a pathogen release. Neither does it attempt to determine the 
likely worst-case outcome from a pathogen release. Instead, the EIS analysis relies on a “limited” 
model to estimate the economic effects of a pathogen release. 
The EIS analysis models the release of three of the pathogens (foot-and-mouth-disease virus, Rift 
Valley fever virus, and Nipah virus) planned to be studied at NBAF.59 The DHS focused much of 
its analytic work upon assessing the economic impact from an FMD outbreak. The DHS found 
that the largest economic factor arose from the expected reduction of trade following an FMD 
outbreak.  
                                                             
55
 For example, see testimony by Edward Hammond, Director, The Sunshine Project, before the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, October 4, 2007. 
56
 See Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Summary Report on Universities’ 
Compliance with Select Agent Regulations, A-04-05-02006, June 2006; and Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of Inspector General, Summary Report on Select Agent Security at Universities, A-04-04-02000, 
March 2004. 
57
 See Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Evaluation 
of the Implementation of the Select Agent or Toxin Regulations—Phase I, Report No. 33601-2-AT, June 2005; and 
Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Evaluation of the 
Implementation of the Select Agent or Toxin Regulations—Phase II, Report No. 33601-3-AT, January 2006. 
58
 Total fines as of October 2009. See online at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/agents_toxins.asp. 
59
 Department of Homeland Security, National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement, 
December 2008, p. D-8. 
The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress 
 
Congressional Research Service 13 
The DHS asserted that an outbreak at any of the proposed sites would have an “equivalent” effect 
on trade.60 The DHS identified the economic impact of a FMD outbreak as being in a range 
between $2.8 billion (Plum Island) and $4.2 billion (Manhattan, Kansas). Other studies have 
identified larger and smaller consequences. In 2008, the USDA developed a complex economic 
model to estimate the costs associated with outbreaks of foreign animal diseases and determined 
an FMD outbreak would cost between $2.8 billion and $4.1 billion.61 The correlation between 
these studies may indicate that the DHS “limited” model provides a sufficient understanding of an 
FMD outbreak’s economic consequences. 
The DHS also considered a release of Rift Valley fever virus, but the EIS does not contain an 
independent estimate of the economic consequences of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever (RVF). 
The EIS asserts the costs of an outbreak might “approach the levels projected by the RVF 
Working Group,” a group of governmental and nongovernmental experts.62 The RVF Working 
Group estimated the economic impact of a RVF outbreak at multiple sites as $50 billion.63 
Policymakers are faced with a wide range of information regarding the potential for a pathogen 
release. The DHS asserts that modern biocontainment equipment and approaches will ameliorate 
the effects of any potential release.64 The GAO asserts that the risk of a pathogen release may be 
minimized but not eliminated.65 The potential economic effects of a disease outbreak may be 
large or small depending on how the outbreak manifests. Key questions for policymakers are 
whether they have sufficient information to decide whether the NBAF should be sited on the 
mainland and whether the potential consequences of a pathogen release are offset by the low 
likelihood of occurrence and the potential benefits from NBAF construction. 
Adequacy of Response Plans 
Given the potential consequences associated with a pathogen release from NBAF, policymakers 
may question the adequacy of the government’s planned response to a release. The USDA 
responded to previous releases of FMD virus on Plum Island and has developed a plan to contain 
an outbreak from a mainland site. According to USDA, the plan accounts for many factors, 
including the size of the outbreak, how the outbreak was detected, and local circumstances. The 
plan includes eradication of all potentially infected wildlife.66 The federal government may be 
less well prepared to contain other diseases it plans to study at NBAF. In August 2007, the USDA 
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and the Rift Valley Fever Working Group noted that the federal government lacked a single 
comprehensive response plan for a Rift Valley fever (RVF) outbreak. Furthermore, the authors 
asserted: 
The United States has national and state assets for vector surveillance, but none for vector 
control. In the event of an RVF outbreak, we would have to rely on cooperation from local 
mosquito abatement agencies that may or may not be distributed where they are most 
needed. The U.S. military has the logistic capability to perform vector control anywhere in 
the country and has done so on a case-by-case basis, but no agreements or even discussions 
have taken place to make the military part of a vector-borne disease response plan.67 
In subsequent meetings, the Rift Valley Working Group noted that the federal government is 
making some progress addressing these needs.68 Although NBAF will not commence research for 
several years, policymakers might decide that response plans should be fully evaluated and 
implemented before NBAF begins operations.  
Should NBAF Be on the Mainland? 
Historically, U.S. researchers have studied highly contagious foreign animal diseases on an island 
separated from the mainland. This policy arose because of concerns that the disease pathogens 
might infect animals and spread through domestic wildlife and livestock. Since biocontainment 
technology has increased in sophistication, DHS has claimed that such research could now be 
performed safely on the mainland. Additionally, policymakers have questioned the efficacy of a 
water barrier in preventing animals from swimming to and from an island site and similarly 
whether air currents could carry pathogens from an island site to the mainland. In the context of 
NBAF siting and construction, policymakers face a tradeoff between a potentially increased risk 
of infection following a pathogen release versus lower construction, operation, and maintenance 
costs, greater operational efficiency, and improved worker ease of access. 
According to DHS, a pathogen release from a laboratory on the mainland would cause greater 
harm than a equivalent release from a laboratory on Plum Island. The DHS noted that “with the 
exception of Plum Island, each of the proposed sites resides in an area where the wildlife, 
vegetation, agriculture, and human populations provide ample opportunity for each of the viruses 
(FMDV, RVFV, and Nipah virus) to become established and spread once released from NBAF.”69 
Largely because of this risk, only the Plum Island site qualified for the “low” site-specific risk 
category while the other sites were deemed “moderate” risk.70 In congressional testimony, DHS 
stated that modern biocontainment technology is sufficient to prevent an accidental release.71 
However, in the EIS, DHS noted that despite “improved engineering and design of high-
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biocontainment biological laboratories, accidents due to human error or maintenance failures ... 
could cause releases,” and described three such incidents since 2006.72 
Some analysts and foreign governments have concluded that research on certain agricultural 
pathogens should only be done in geographically isolated laboratories.73 According to the GAO, 
when the governments of Denmark and Germany faced the same question of whether to build 
new foot and mouth disease laboratories on the mainland or to replace aging island laboratory 
infrastructure, both governments decided to keep the laboratories on islands.74 The government of 
Australia chose to contract its research using live FMD virus to locations in other countries. In 
contrast, FMD research is conducted in a mainland laboratory in Canada.75 
Legal Restrictions on Foot and Mouth Disease Virus Research on the Mainland 
Despite the potentially higher costs of a Rift Valley fever virus release, most of the debate about 
the proposed mainland location of the NBAF has focused on an FMD outbreak. This focus likely 
arises in part from the existing legal restrictions placed on such research. Currently, research on 
live FMD virus is statutorily limited to locations outside of the mainland of the United States. 
Only if the Secretary of Agriculture provides an explicit permit under 21 U.S.C. 113a may 
research on live FMD virus be performed on the mainland of the United States.76 
When PIADC was transferred to DHS, the Secretary of Agriculture retained the authority to 
prevent FMD research from being performed on the mainland of the United States. If NBAF is 
located on the mainland of the United States and is to perform high-value foreign animal disease 
research, researchers at the facility will likely need to receive such permission from the Secretary 
of Agriculture to perform FMD research.77 
On June 18, 2008, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (also referred to as the 2008 
farm bill) was enacted with a provision (section 7524) that requires the Secretary of Agriculture 
to issue a permit to DHS for live FMD virus research at one successor facility to PIADC. The 
provision states that, once issued, the permit can only be suspended, revoked, or otherwise 
impaired if the Secretary of Agriculture determines that the FMD research is not being carried out 
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in compliance with the select agent regulations. This provision preserves the restrictions on FMD 
research that have existed in 21 U.S.C. 113a—including USDA’s authority to control 
possession—but provides one exception to allow DHS to possess and work with the virus. 
The DHS and USDA agreed that a permit will be issued to a successor facility to PIADC located 
on the mainland. According to DHS, 
On December 18, 2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff sent a letter 
to the Secretary of Agriculture, Ed Schafer requesting that a permit be issued if a mainland 
site is selected. On January 9, 2009, DHS received a letter from Secretary Schafer that 
affirmed USDA’s intention of complying with Congressional direction to issue a permit for 
the movement and use of live FMDV at the NBAF.78 
Congressional Restrictions on the Use of Appropriated Funds 
In 2008, GAO concluded that DHS had not performed the necessary analysis to determine 
whether it is possible to safely perform FMD research on the mainland.79 Congress, faced with 
the possibility that DHS had not fully assessed the risks arising from a mainland release of 
pathogens, directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to complete “a risk assessment of 
whether foot-and-mouth disease work can be done safely on the United States mainland.”80 
Congress prohibited using FY2009 appropriations for NBAF construction on the mainland until 
DHS made this assessment and GAO reviewed it. In response, DHS asserted that the risk 
assessment work done in the EIS met this statutory requirement. 
In 2009, GAO was again critical of the risk assessment provided to them. The GAO identified 
several weaknesses, including the use of a model not designed for pathogen transport; lack of 
consideration of particular, rather than average, wind strength and direction; and the failure to 
conservatively consider all parameters. Additionally, GAO found that DHS did not integrate the 
component assessments performed as parts of the NBAF risk assessment.81 
Citing GAO’s criticism, Congress prohibited DHS from obligating FY2010 funds for NBAF 
construction until DHS “undertakes a bio-safety and bio-security mitigation risk assessment ... to 
determine the requirements for the safe operation of the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas.”82 The 
DHS is directed to use the National Academy of Sciences to obtain an independent evaluation of 
this study within four months of the study’s completion. The DHS plans to complete its risk 
assessment before the end of FY2010.83 
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Coordination of Research Activities with Other Agencies 
Since NBAF would replace PIADC, policymakers expect USDA and DHS will collaborate on 
research at NBAF. At PIADC, DHS and USDA cooperatively set research priorities, based on risk 
assessment and other information. Generally, USDA performs basic research activities while 
DHS develops the results of that research and attempts to translate them into practical 
applications.84 However, since NBAF also represents an expansion in capacity and capability over 
PIADC, this relationship may change. Establishment of the new facility provides an opportunity 
for policymakers to evaluate previous agreements and make adjustments. Assignment of lab 
space to the Department of Health and Human Services or other agencies may require 
reevaluation and updates to these procedures.85 
The USDA and DHS have testified that their current agreements have served them well at 
PIADC, with respect to both daily operation and transfer of technical information regarding 
research results and priorities.86 Such interagency coordination may be essential in case of a crisis 
or in dealing with an outbreak of animal disease. The extent to which all agencies engaged in 
NBAF agree on how to coordinate roles and responsibilities may prove to be a key factor in 
maintaining clear lines of authority and information and may be crucial to effective oversight of 
the facility. 
The DHS states that it relies on the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Foreign 
Animal Disease Threat Subcommittee to facilitate the overall interagency coordination and to 
integrate interagency R&D efforts.87 This subcommittee has issued a research and development 
strategic plan for government efforts against foreign animal disease.88 Within DHS, the Joint Agro 
Defense Office (JADO) provides coordination and staff support for the development and 
maintenance of an integrated interagency research and development (R&D) strategy for foreign 
animal disease defense. In FY2009 and FY2010, DHS plans to have JADO assess strategic R&D 
opportunities at NBAF.89 
Timeliness of Construction Activities 
When complete, NBAF would eventually house all research activities underway at PIADC. The 
DHS considers PIADC to be approaching the end of its design lifetime. The DHS must finish 
construction of NBAF and achieve operational status before down-sizing or decommissioning 
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PIADC if research continuity is to be maintained. Because of the unique research currently 
performed at PIADC, the smooth transition of this capacity may be an issue of congressional 
concern. Beyond the transition of research projects, programs, and supplies, transfer of personnel 
and retention of an experienced workforce may also pose a challenge to DHS and USDA. The 
DHS and USDA ability to plan for this transition relies on timely NBAF construction. 
The original NBAF schedule, as presented to Congress, proposed finishing construction and 
commissioning NBAF in FY2010. The DHS has extended the proposed schedule several times. 
In June 2006, DHS estimated NBAF operations would begin in 2013.90 Until February 2008, the 
DHS website indicated that operations would begin in 2013 or 2014.91 In July 2008, DHS 
estimated NBAF would be completed by January 1, 2015.92 In 2009, DHS estimated NBAF 
would be completed in 2015 and become fully operational in 2017.93 
Each extension of the NBAF construction schedule increases the time that PIADC will be in 
operation. The PIADC has historically had security, coordination, and other challenges.94 The 
DHS has developed and implemented a multi-year Corrective Action Plan to address these issues 
and maintain the operation of PIADC.95 Extended operation and maintenance of PIADC facilities 
may not be as cost effective or as efficient for the research endeavor as completing and 
transitioning research to NBAF. The DHS spent approximately $24 million in FY2007 and $17 
million in FY2008 to upgrade the facilities at PIADC. The DHS has not requested additional 
appropriation for upgrades since FY200896 and does not plan to in future years.97 The upgrades 
include designing a new animal wing and continuing activities described in the Corrective Action 
Plan. The DHS expects completion of these upgrades in FY2010.98 Further NBAF construction 
delays may require additional funds be used to support PIADC’s corrective maintenance. 
Selling Plum Island 
The DHS proposed selling Plum Island and using the profit from such a sale to offset the 
construction costs of NBAF, the decontamination and remediation costs for the island, and the 
demolition costs for the PIADC. Under this proposal, DHS would sell Plum Island, arrange with 
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the purchaser to allow PIADC operations to continue until NBAF construction was finished, and 
transfer Plum Island to the purchaser only after clean up of the island had been completed.99 
Congress endorsed this proposal in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and 
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329, signed into law September 30, 2008). 
Most sales of surplus property are handled by the General Services Administration (GSA), and 
any funds received are directed to the Treasury.100 In contrast, P.L. 110-329 provided authority for 
DHS to receive the proceeds of the sale of Plum Island. Because the DHS Secretary chose a site 
other than Plum Island for NBAF, Section 540 requires the Secretary to sell Plum Island through 
GSA. The proceeds of such a sale 
shall be deposited as offsetting collections into the Department of Homeland Security 
Science and Technology “Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations” account 
and, subject to appropriation, shall be available until expended, for site acquisition, 
construction, and costs related to the construction of the National Bio and Agro-defense 
Facility, including the costs associated with the sale, including due diligence requirements, 
necessary environmental remediation at Plum Island, and reimbursement of expenses 
incurred by the General Services Administration which shall not exceed 1 percent of the sale 
price: Provided further, That after the completion of construction and environmental 
remediation, the unexpended balances of funds appropriated for costs in the preceding 
proviso shall be available for transfer to the appropriate account for design and construction 
of a consolidated Department of Homeland Security Headquarters project, excluding daily 
operations and maintenance costs, notwithstanding section 503 of this Act, and the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be 
notified 15 days prior to such transfer. 
The DHS intends to sell Plum Island in FY2011. The DHS plans to continue operating PIADC 
and to pay rent to the new owner of Plum Island until NBAF is ready for full operation in 
FY2017.101 
The amount of money that might result from liquidation of the Plum Island assets is uncertain. 
Variations in remediation costs for environmental clean-up of the island and fluctuations in 
property values, for example, contribute sizeable uncertainties to any estimate of a future sale’s 
proceeds. Additionally, rental payments for the continued operation of PIADC until NBAF 
completion will reduce the net proceeds of the sale. The sale might provide net funds insufficient 
for NBAF construction or might provide substantial surplus funds even after NBAF construction 
is complete.  
Community Concerns 
Experience at Plum Island suggests that community concerns could affect a new relocated 
facility. Operation of PIADC has engendered some controversy among nongovernmental 
organizations and others. These groups have expressed concerns about the potential for pathogen 
release, illicit research, and unintended consequences.102 Local opposition also increased 
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following suggestions by the federal government of upgrading PIADC biocontainment facilities 
from BSL-3Ag to BSL-4 to allow work on more dangerous pathogens. Those suggestions were 
not acted upon.103 Questions regarding worker safety and the potential for human infections by 
pathogens that affect both humans and animals have also been raised.104 The DHS, through 
informational sessions in the EIS process, has attempted to allay these concerns and has stated 
that community acceptance, or at least minimal community resistance, was one of the NBAF site 
criteria. However, continued community outreach may be a key factor in determining whether 
NBAF will suffer delays that have threatened construction of other high-containment 
laboratories.105 
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